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This paper attempts to measure the effect of occupational
licensing, restrictions on reciprocity, location specific investment in
reputation and earnings on the interstate mobility of professionals.
While 34 professional occupations are analyzed, special attention is
focused on the legal profession. The comparatively low interstate
mobility rate of lawyers may be due to state licensing and restrictions
on reciprocity or to the investments made by lawyers to develop local
reputations or to the investments made by lawyers in state specific law.
Tests are conducted to distinguish among these three hypotheses.Introduction
The interstate migration of human resources has attracted the atten-
tion of an increasing number of economists. Recent advances in the theory
of human capital have focused on the importance of age and education in
explaining the migration of workers. An older literature in the field of
industrial organization emphasized the importance of licensing and reci-
procity to explain differences between occupations in earnings and mobility.
Yet to be undertaken is a study which combines those determinants of
mobility stressed by the human capital theorists with those advanced by
students of industrial organization. Recent work in the field has slighted
the effect of class of worker on interstate mobility. Many professionals
are independent businessmen, either sole proprietors or partners. Dentists,
lawyers, optometrists, physicians and veterinarians invest resources through-
out their careers to develop business reputations and goodwill. Reputation
and business contacts are to a large degree location specific and depreciate
rapidly if the practitioner leaves the immediate market. On the other hand,
professionals primarily employed by firms would suffer smaller losses in
goodwill if they left the immediate geographical market. A serious study
of the determinants of mobility of professionals, as this study purports to
be, must take cognizance of reputation capital and measure its importance
in explaining differences in occupational mobility.
This paper will focus special attention on the legal profession. The
legal profession is granted special attention not only because licensing by
state bar examination is common and because lawyers in large part are inde-
pendent businessmen but also because the practice of law, unlike the practice
of dentistry or medicine, has some state bpecific features. It can be and has2
been argued that law and procedure vary from one state to the next, and
that a seasoned lawyer is reluctant to launch a new practice in another
state. Lesser interstate mobility of lawyers might be explained by any
one or a combination of three hypotheses: (1) licensing with restrictions
on reciprocity, (2) investments in reputation capital, and (3) investments
in state specific law and procedure. A major endeavor of this paper is to
formulate tests that distinguish between these three hypotheses.
SectionI summizes the existing theory of mobility, while Section II
discusses the measurement of interstate mobility and licensing. The empirical
resultsare presented in Section III. Tests of the state specific law
hypothesis are reviewed in Section IV.Themajor results of the paper are
suarized. in the last section, and several possible extensions of the work
are indicated.
I. Interstate Mobility: A Capsule Surimiairoftfl
ExistingTheory
The theory of mobility is in its formative stages. Schwartz (1976)
has recently presented a theory to explain several known regularities in
mobility patterns as revealed in census data.
Schwartz developed a theory of the effects of age and education on
the area of search over a homogeneous plane by prospective employers and
employees. Job seekers and employers substitute between a more intensive
search of a given area (by expanding the share of population considered for
the job) and a more extensive search over a larger geographical area. Two
implications of the theory are of immediate interest: (1) the interstate
migration rate, the proportion of employees that move a given distance, de-
clines with age at a rate which increases with education, and (2) the expected3
distance moved by a prospective employee increases with the level of educa-
tion (and may either increase or decrease with age). Given the number of
positions to be filled, employers have a greater incentive to search over a
larger area for younger prospective employees than to search over a smaller
area and to try and attract older prospective employees, the higher are educa-
tional requirements of the position. The job seeker also trades off between
the waiting time before a position is found and the area of search. If
waiting time increases with education and age given the area searched, there
will be an incentive to search over a larger area (to reduce waiting time)
the higher is educational attainment or age. Thus, firms and job seekers
search over larger areas as education level increases. Consequently, the
expected distance moved of successful applicants would be expected to rise
with educational attainment. Given education, older individuals also search
over a larger area but the pecuniary cost of transportation and the non-
pecuniary cost of changing locations may rise with age so that the expected
distance moved may or may not increase with age.
The objective of Schwartz was to advance a theory capable of explaining
the known regularities i gross mobility patterns of broadly defined groups
classified by age and education. The theory appears well suited for this
purpose but is less well suited to analyze the mobility of occupations.
Consequently, some extensions of the theory need to be considered if differ-
ences in mobility rates between occupations are to be explained. Schwartz
assumed that job opportunities are homogeneous over space. The number of
substitute employers or employees do not differ from one location to another.
Of course, the distance between substitute employers differs appreciably from
one occupation to another. Professors have fewer substitute employers withinit
a city than accountants. The higher interstate mobility of professors should
not be attributed to educational achievement until an adjustment for the
smaller number of educational institutions per state is made.
The class of worker can be safely ignored when explaining differences
in interstate mobility rates of all workers by education and age. But the
effect of private practice on mobility cannot be safely ignored in a study
of professional occupations. The cost of mobility is higher to those in
private practice selling directly to the public. Other factors considered,
lesser mobility may be expected in those occupations where it is relatively
more expensive to attract customers and to establish business reputations in
new markets. In these occupations comparatively fewer older practitioners
should be prepared to move and to establish a business in a new market than
in occupations with salaried members)1
A final comment deserves mention. In large degree schwartz's theory
is a supply theory of mobility. Once again, an analysis of occupations
requires some attention be paid to demand factors. Differential growth
rates between occupations and between states within each occupation should be
considered to determine how important are demand factors in explaining inter-
state mobility between occupations.
These observations indicate interstate mobility would differ between
occupations even in the absence of licensing and restrictions on reciprocity.
Licensing and restrictions on reciprocity impose added costs on potential
movers. There appear to be larger differences between occupations in the use
of licensing and the conditions for reciprocity than there are between states
within an occupation. This fact alone suggests that a study of occupations is
'Older lawyers, dentists, etc. should be more likely tostay put than
older engineers, accountants, etc.5
an attractive method to determine the effect of licensing on mobility
in general and. on the mobility of lawyers in particular. However, a study
of different occupations is not without important drawbacks. The major
determinants of mobility, other than licensing, must be included in the
analysis. An acceptable method must be discovered for ranking occupations
with regard to the use of licensing and to the practice of reciprocity.
these are considerable achievements that invite criticism given the scarcity
of information.
A study of occupations may for many purposes be a more efficient
method of detecting the effects of licensing and restrictions on reciprocity
on interstate mobility. Nevertheless, a study of states can provide some
useful tests of state specific law hypothesis. Indeed,testsof the impor-
tance of state specific law are difficult but not impossible to make without
state data. While most of the tests in this paper will use the occupation
as the unit of observation, a few will rely on state data to provide supple-
mental tests of the determinants of lawyer mobility.
II. The Measurement of Interstate Mobility
and Licensing
Holen used two measures of interstate mobility in a pilot study of the
dental, medical and legal professions (Holen 1965). One measure was the inter-
state migration rate-—the number of out—of—state movers over a period of time
relative to the total members in the occupation. The second measure was the
conditional probability of moving out of state given an out—of—county change
in residence——the number of out—of—state movers relative to the number of out—
of-county movers.-' These two measures o mobility are retained for use and
'The 1970 Census ofPopulation identifies the number or individuals
whose residence in 1965 was in a different state than the residence in 1970,
Strictly speaking, the Census data donot enumerate the number of movers since
an individual who left and then returned to the state between 1965 and 1970 would
not be counted as a mover by the Census.6
augmented by yet another measure——the conditional probability of remaining
in the county of residence given no interstate change in residence. This
measure is a retention probability, the opposite of a mobility probability.
It measures the number remaining in the county of residence (be they stayers
or intra county movers) relative to the number who remain in the state over
the period of measurement. This retention probability reflects the net
advantages of remaining in the same county relative to other locations in
the state. The formal definition of each measure and the symbol assigned to
each are presented below.
1. Interstate Migration Rate (I.M.R.)—-Members of an occupation
whose 1970 residence was outside the state of residence in
1965 relative to all members of the occupation in l97O.'
2. Probability of an Interstate Move Given an_Out—of—County
Move (P.I.M.)——Members of an occupation whose 1910 residence
was outside the state of residence in 1965 relative to those
members who were living outside the county of residence in 1965.
3. Probability of Remaining in County Given No_Interstate Move
(P.l.C. )—-'Tembers of an occupation whose county of residence was
the same in 1970 and 1965 relative to those members whose state
of residence was the same in 1910 and 1965.
A numerical illustration will indicate how these measures are calculated
and will reveal the difference between them. The 1970 Census of Population
indicates 50,073 lawyers lived in a different county in 1910 than in 1965. Of
these, 22,342 or (P.I.M. =).116lived in a different state in 1970 than In
'Individuals are excluded if abroad or if no information was supplied.7
1965. The probability of an interstate move given an out—of—county- move
was .l6 for lawyers. The 22,3I2 lawyers who moved across boundaries
represented (I.M.R. ).105of all lawyers in 1970 (after excluding those
abroad in 1965 and those lawyers submitting no response). The interstate
migration rate of lawyers was slightly higher than 10%. A large number
of lawyers——162,776 remained in the same county. This number represented
(P.l.c. )85%of all lawyers whose residence was in the same state in 1965
and 1970.
Each of the three measures identifies a different aspect of migration.
The interstate migration rate gives an indication of the relative importance
of interstate migratory activity in an occupation. The probability- of an
interstate move is more closely related to the distance moved since it is
the proportion moving out-of—state-relative to all out—os—county movers.
The retention probability reflects the net advantage of locations within
the county relative to locations elsewhere in the state and only reflects intra-.
state factors that determine location of residence within the state.
In principle, no relationship need exist between the three measures.
This may be seen more clearly by considering the definition of each measure.
If T denotes the total number of members in an occupation, S denotes
members in the same residence (noninovers), INC denotes movers ho remain
in same county, INS denotes movers in different county- but.in the same state
and OUTS denotes movers located in a different state in 1965 than in 1970





-S+INC c. PlC =
S+INC+INS8
The interstate r ration rate can be low in an occupation because relatively
few members move across state boundaries even though the probability of an
interstate move is high because moves are of long distances when out—of—county
moves are made. Similarly, a low I.M.R. could be associated with either a
high or low P.l.C. because individuals might remain in the same county or
might move into other counties within the same state. In fact, the measures








Occupations where moves tend to be over longer distances are usually those
where a relatively larger share of members are undertaking interstate moves.
Similarly, occupations with relatively large amounts of interstate activity
are ones where intrastate retention probabilities are relatively low. On
the other hand, the correlation between the probability of an interstate
move and the retention probability is small. A high retention probability
should not affect the distance moved once an out—of--county move is made.
Table 1 shows the three measures for each of 3)4 professional occupa-
tions. The selected occupations have characteristics similar to the legal
profession——higher educational attainment, primarily male members and above
a minimum size. The selection was limited to those occupations classified
as professional by the Census Bureau with 60% or more male members and with9
atleast 4,500 members.' Each of these occupations was classified further
into one of three groups: (1) occupations without formal licensing require-S
inents with few if any legal barriers to interstate mobility, (2) occupations
with state licensing and with many states granting reciprocity, and (3) occupa-
tions with licensing and evidence of more restrictions on the use of recipro—
city.' Occupations were classified after two somewhat dated publications
on licensing published by the Council of State Governments (1952)(l961)
were consulted.
Table 1 shows lower mean values for the interstate migration rate
(I.M.R.) and probability of an interstate move (P.I.M.) of occupations with
licensing than those without. Still lower means appear for occupations with
'Oneoccupation----coaches and physicai education professors——was
excluded.
'The classification of occupationsamong the three groups is not
easily made and involves judgment. In some occupations the requirements
for reciprocity differ across states. Developing a continuous measure of
reciprocity for different occupations is difficult given the variety of
conditions imposed by states before reciprocity is granted. A further
difficulty is the lack of information of the implementation of the formal
conditions imposed by the states. Under these circumstances a more promising
approach is to merely assign each occupation to one of the three broad
groups. The classification of the judicial profession was particularly
difficult to make. While judges do not complete a formal test process, they
are evaluated and recommended by a commission, and sometimes confirmed by a
legislative body. Some are elected. Reciprocity has little applicability
in this profession. These considerations provide some justification for
classifying the judicial profession as a licensed one with limits placed On
reciprocity. The classification of accountants may be questioned and with
some justification. While C.P.A.'s are examined, the licensing of other
accountants appears to vary across states and is of more recent vintage.Licensiog
10
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SOURCE: 1970 U.S. Census of Population, Mobility for States and the Nation. PC(2) 2B, pp. 38..414.
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lesser reciprocity than those with." College and university professors
have relatively high migration rates and probabilities. In contrast, judges
have very low migration rates and probabilities.
These comparisons, crude as they are, suggest that licensing and re-
strictions on reciprocity have reduced the interstate flow of human capital.
There is, however, evidence that the retention probability varies with the
use of licensing.The mean retention probabilities are higher in licensed
rather than unlicensed occupations. This is a curious finding. The value
oflicensing and of restrictions on reciprocity to members of an occupation
would appear greater when retention probabilities are relatively low. This
finding may mean that licensing is a useful device to control the flow of
younger practitioners across state boundaries. In any event, the lower
interstate migration rates and probabilities of an interstate move in
licensed occupations may be caused in part by the higher cost of establishing
new practices in different markets, and at this point cannot be attributed
solely to licensing and restrictions on reciprocity.
61t should be noted that differences betweenoccupations in the
probability of an interstate move have narrowed over time.
Percent
1950 1970 Change
1. Dentists .385 .1498 26%
2. Lawyers and Judges .363 .14145 23
3. Architects .552 .556 1
4. Optometrists .520 .14141 —15
5. Pharmacists .390 .347 —11
6.Physicians .683 .650 —5
7.Accountants .1487 .48o —
8.C1errinen .148i .148 1
9.Engineers .583 .6i14 5
10.Chemists .563 .647 15
11.College Professors .708 .731 3
These results suggest that restrictions on reciprocity have been declining
over time in dentistry and law.12
The logit model has been employed to estimate the determinants of
I.M.R. andP.I.M.If I, denotes a measure of interstate mobility in the




where u is a disturbance term and Xj is a vector of independent
variables. A transformation of (i) yields
ri
(2) H E9..n I= —[f(x.)+ u.]
L''iJ
Theselection of the independent variables is dictated in part by
the theory developed by Schwartz, by the importance of local goodwill in
some occupations, by the importance of growth in producing interstate
migration, and by the importance of licensin( and restrictions on reci-
procity.
The definition of and the symbols used for each of the independent
variables are:
1. Age of Worker
Two variables are employed to measure the effect of age.
a. Median Age of Worker in Experienced Civilian Labor Force,
1970 (AGE).
b. Percent of Workers in Experienced Civilian Labor Force
Less than Thirty Years Old, 1970 (YOUTH).
This variable was employed to determine if occupations with a
larger percent of younger workers would record greaber interstate13
mobility because of the change in residency during the
transition from college to work.1'
2. Educational Attainment
The information on education attainment of professionals in the
1970 Census of Population is deficient. The highest measured attainment
was the open—ended class with 17 or more years of formal education. The median
educational attainment in many professional occupations exceeds 17years.
This is a serious limitation and one not easily overcome. Two substitute
measures were employed although both are subject to their own limitations:
a. Percent of Experienced Civilian Labor Force (16 years or older)
with Five or More Years of College 1970 (EDU).
b. Mean Earnings, Fall—Time Workers, 1969 (F.T. EARNINGS)
The selection of full—time earnings was indicated because EDU contains
greater measurement error in occupations with higher educational attainment.
EDU does not distinguish sufficiently between dentists andlawyers on the one
hand and physicians and college and university professorson the other hand.
Given age, differences in earnings will better reflect differences Ineduca-
tional attainment as well as differences in mean quality of membersacross
occupations.
3. Class of Worker
The Census of Population classifies workers into threegroups:
a. Percent of Workers in Private Practice, 1970 (PRI—PRACT).
b. Percent of Workers Salaried In Government, 1970 (GOv).
c. Percent of Workers Salaried in Firms and Other rTonprofit
Institutions, 1970 (PRI—SAL).
1'YOU3O isnegatively correlated with AGE (r =-.92).l4
Because the sum of these three variables equals unity, only the first
two are included in the regressions. The coefficients of PRI—PRACT and GOV
measure the effect of each of these variables relative to the effect of
PRI-SAL.
Ii..Supply of Substitute Eniplqyers
The number of colleges and universities per state is typically smaller
than the number of firms per state. Therefore, a location change by a
professor has a higher probability of involving an interstate move. A
variable is required to distinguish between academic occupations and other
occupations.—'
a. Enplôyed byCollegeor University, 1970 (UNIVER):
A dummy variable is assigned a value of one in the occupation
is composed of college and university teachers.
5.Licensingand Reciproc
Several dumny variables are used to determine the effect of licensing
and the effect of restrictions on reciprocity on interstate flows of human
capital.
a. Licensed Occupations with Reciprocity (LIREC): This variable is
assigned a value of one if the occupation is licensed and if
reciprocity is granted by many states.
b. Licensed Occupations With Little Evidence of Reciprocity (LICNREC):
This variable is assigned a value of one if the occupation is
licensed and if reciprocity is seldom granted or if reciprocity
is granted only after many conditions are satisfied. The definition
of LIREC and of LINREC implies the effect on interstate mobility of
would also be desirable to distinguish between the availability
of substitutes among nonacademic occupations.15
adding restrictions on reciprocity in an already licensed
occupation is measured by the difference between the coeffi-
cients of LINREC and LIREC.
c. Dummy Variables for Each Licensed Occupation with Restrictions
on Reciprocity. These variables were introduced to determine
if the effect of LINREC on mobility was solely due to the inclusion
of judges in the LINREC class.
1. Judicial Occupation (JUD): This variable is assigned a value
of one if the occupation is the judiciary.
2. Legal Occupation (LAW): This variable is assigned a value of
ore if the occupation is the legal profession.
3. Dental Occupation (DENT): This variable is assigned a value of
one if the occupation is the dental profession.
6. Growth in Market Demand
There were substantial differences in the growth rates of occupations
between 1960—1970. If this national growth rate was experienced uniformly
across the states, there would be no reason to expect the growth rate in the
total number of members in the occupation to affect interstate mobility. If
the variability in state growth rates increases with the growth rate of the
occupation, then occupations with higher national growth rates would experience
greater interstate mobility as members leave slower growing states for faster
growing states. This assumption was verified by selecting a random sample of
i6 states and 28 occupations, and then finding the variability in state growth
rates increased with the mean growth rate of the occupation.
a. Growth Rate in the Number of Workers in C.L.F. between 1960
and 1970 (GROWTH).
A list of the variables and the assigned symbols is reproduced in




2. P.I.M. =Probabilityof an Interstate Move Given an Out—of—County
Move
3. P.l.C. Probability of Remaining in County Given No Interstate Move
4.AGE =MedianAge of Worker, 1970
5.YOUTH =Percentof Workers in C. L. F. Less than Thirty Years Old,
1970
6.EDU =Percentof Workers in C. L. F. with Five or More Years of
College, 1970
7.F.T.EARNINGS =MeanEarnings of Full—Time Workers (50—52 weeks), 1969
8. PRI—PRACT =Percentof Workers in Private Practice, 1970
9.GOV =Percentof Workers Employed by Government, 1970
10. PRI—SAL =Percentof Workers Salaried by Firms and Nonprofit
Institutions, 1970
11. UNIITER =VariableAssigned a Value of One if Occupation is Composed
of College and University Professors
12. LIREC =VariableAssigned a Value of One if Occupation is Licensed
and if Reciprocity is granted by states
13. LINREC =VariableAssigned a Value of One if Occupation is Licensed
and if Reciprocity is seldom granted by states
l. JIJD =VariableAssigned a Value of One if Occupation is the Judiciary
15. LAW =VariableAssigned a Value of One if Occupation is the Legal
Profession
16. DENT =VariableAssigned a Value of One if Occupation is the Dental
Profession
17.GROWTH =GrowthRate of Workers in C. L. F. Between 1960 and 1970.17
III. Empirical Results
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table II,
where the dependent variable is log[I.M.R./(1 -I.M.R.)],and in Table III,
where the dependent variable is log[P.I.M./(l -P.I.M.)].The results
for those variables other than the licensing variable will be discussed first,
with comments on the effects of the licensing variables reserved for later.
Median age is inversely related to I.M.R. and P.I.M. It would
appear that interstate migration activity is lower and the distance moved
(as approximated by P.I.M.) is shorter in occupations with older members.
The coefficients of the other age variable, the percent of members less than
30 years old, are consistently negative. It may be recalled that YOUTH was
expected to increase mobility if members under 30 made interstate changes as
the transition between formal schooling and the job market was made. The
reason for the negative coefficient is not altogether clear, but the chief
culprit appears to be errors of measurement in the education variable. While
interstate mobility may in fact rise with educational attainment, this effect
may not appear in the regression results because of errors in the measurement
in EDU. Instead., interstate mobility will appear to be inversely related to
YOUTH if YOUTH is more closely correlated to the true but unobserved value of
educational achievement.2/ The errors of measurement in EDU may also be
responsible for the significant effect of earnings on interstate migratory
activity. Because the possibility of errors of measurement exists, it is not
possible to resolve the central issue of whether interstate migration is
determined by earnings or educational attainment.
21'The correlation between YOUTH and EDU issurprisingly low, r =.05.
This may be a sign of the seriousness of measurement errors in EDTJ and/or






















































5. EDO .011 .005 -.56-03 .22-02 .5-02-.5-O2




























































*denoteS t ratio between i.6oand 1.99
**
denotest ratio between 1.99 and 2.99
denotes t ratio greater than 2.9919
TABLE III






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. CONSTANT 4.75 3.88 3.97 3.65* 6.O2 — — .w
2.AGE -J1 -.10 -.11 -.].O -.11 -.14
** ** -* * **
3.LIREC -.61 -.67 -.62 -.53 -.69 - .57
4.LINREC -1.11 -1.15 -i.o6 -1.16 -.99
5. u .16-02 .35-02 .12-03 .11-02 .70-02 .29-04
**
6.F.T.EARNGS .148_02 .39-02 .46-02 .47-02 .25-02 .42-02
7.PRI-PRACT. .08 .01 .08 -.20 -.39 -.26
8.GOV .56 .38 .40 .37 .05 .15
9.Y0U -.04 -.O4 -.04 -.04 -.05 -.07
10. tJNIVER. .19 .14 .35






P2 .891 .894 .901 .403 .947 .966
.211 .211 .209 .217 .168 .134
N 34 34 34 34 28 28
*
denotest ratio between i.6o and 1.99
denotest ratio between 1.99 and 2.99
*4Hfdenotes tratio'eater than 2.9920
An important finding is that P.l.C. or local reputation has a signif-
icant effect in reducing the interstate thigration rate but not the probability
of an interstate move. Hence, the interstate migration rate is lower in
occupations where local reputation appears to be important. Not surprisingly,
the distance moved, as approximated by P.I.M., is not related to local capital
as measured by P.l.C. Once a move is made out of the local market, the
importance of local reputation should not determine if the move is over a
short or long distance.'
If the growth rate of an occupation has an effect, it is on I.M.R.
and not on P.I.M. There is some weak evidence that more rapidly growing
occupations experience higher interstate migration rates, but the t values
are lower and a cautious interpretation is suggested.
The coefficients of each of the licensing variables are of considerable
interest. In each table the coefficients of LIREC and LINREC are negative
and often have t ratios exceeding 3. The coefficient of LINREC, the
variable for licensed occupations with little reciprocity, is as expected,
algebraically smaller than the coefficient of LIREC, the variable for licensed
occupations with fewer restrictions on reciprocity. Column 14 of each table
indicates the difference in coefficients is not due solely to the lower inter-
state mobility of judges. The dummy coefficients for the three occupations,
law, dentistry and judiciary, indicate significantly lower interstate migration
rates with judges having substantially lower rates, followed by lawyers and
then dentists. In review, these results indicate licensing itself reduces the
interstate migration rate and the probability of an interstate move and the
restrictions on reciprocity reduce I.M.R. and P.I.M. still further.
-"While P.l.C. is related to I.M.R., the proportion of workers in
private practice is not. Surprisingly, the simple correlation between P.l.C.
and PRI-PRACT is only .29.21
The quantitative effect of licensing and restrictions onreciprocity
on the interstate migration rate is illustrated for the dental and legalpro-
fessions in Table 4Ifreciprocity was practiced in the dental and legal
professions, the interstate migration rate would rise from .105 to .150—.153 in the
legal profession and from .098 to .133—.l50 in the dental profession.
Elimination of the all licensing raises the migration rate to .218_.275 for
the legal profession and to .218—.271 for the dental profession.' These
sample calculations show the largest effects on mobility spring from licensing
itself. Hence, with smaller effects traceable to restrictionson mobility,
the effects of licensing are not simply to reduce the numbersor to certify
quality, effects which are frequently mentioned by economists, but to reduce
the interstate flow of human capital.
Interestingly enough, the predicted interstate migration rates with
the removal of licensing in dentistry and law would closely approximate the
mean of the rates for nonlicensed, nonacademic professions. The reduced
mobility due to the greater importance of local reputation and age is offset
by the greater mobility caused by higher earnings, etc.
Two unresolved issues about the effects of licensing and restrictions
on reciprocity on interstate mobility remain and require further comment and
study. First, why should and do licensed occupations practicing reciprocity
have lower interstate migration rates and lower probabilities ofan interstate
move than unlicensed occupations? The answer to this query is that the formal
conditions about the practice of reciprocity are not in fact implemented and
that reciprocity is not practiced in all states so that licensedoccupations
-'These predictionsassume changes in licensing status would not
change the other independent variables, e.g., age and earnings.22
TABLEIV
ESTIMATEDEFFECT OFLICENSING ANDRESTRICTIONSON





Estimate Derived Estimate Derived
From Table II From Table II
Equation Equation EquationEquation
3 14 3 14
1. Actual Interstate
Migration Rate .098 .098 .105 .105
2. Estimated Interstate
Migration Rate .097 .098 .097 .105
3. Predicted I.M.R. with
Licensing and with
Reciprocity .150 .133 .150 .153
14. Predicted I.M.R. with
Licensing Eliminated .2714 .218 .275 .214823
with the apparent liberal use of reciprocity are a quantum jump away from
occupations free of licensing. Indeed, the empirical results imply the
licensed occupations practicing reciprocity have characteristics more similar
to licensed occupations that limit the use of reciprocity than to unlicensed
occupations. The second issue is whether the state specific law is capable
of explaining the lover interstate migration rate of lawyers. Evidence
bearing on this issue is presented in the next section of this paper.
IV. Investment in State Specific Law
Investments in state specific law may be made in law school if the
curriculum and t1e state bar examstressstate law and procedure or through
experiences and practice. The results of tests of these two hypotheses
are suxmnarized below.
A. Investment in Specific State Law and
Law School Education
If the state bar examination emphasize state law, the curriculum
ai of local law schools will be devoted in part o state law courses. If
the curriculum of law schools focused on stat law, law professors as well
as lawyers should be less mobile since they t o would have made investments
in state specific law. Table 5 shows the mt rstate mobility rate of law
professors is more like that of their acadeini counterparts than the rtte
for lawyers is like that of their business co terparts. This indirect test
suggests that state specific investments are Ct made by law students during
the formal education process.
'Thepresence of national law school like Chicago, Harvard, Stanford,
Yale, etc., indicates a nonnegligible fractio of law students undertake




















































































SOURCE: 1910 U.S. Census ol' Population, Mobility for States
and the Nation. PC(2) 38—1414.25
If specific state law is taught in la
the bar exam, graduates of law schools in ea
pass rate on the state bar examination than
schools, holding qua.lity of law student cons
hypothesis is possible since California repo
andout-of—statelaw school graduates. The
graduates of California law schools approved
did outperform graduates of A.B.A. approved
fifties but that differences in pass rates Ii
during the sixties and seventies. Table VII
graduates of a selected number of law school
quality. These figures indicate the pass ra
Harvard, and Yale law schools were comparabl
while the pass rate of graduates from the Un
favorably to those of graduates of the Unive
On the whole these data suggest that state s
for on the California bar exam and probably
of the curriculum of California law schools
B. Investment in State Specific Law
and Experience
Knowledge of state specific law and r
practice.Lawyers who have made investments
a lower probability of moving across state t
practices are more likely to require investn
13/—Harvard,Stanford and Yale are us
schools. Hence, the performance of graduat€
be expected to be similar.
w school and examined for on
ch state should have a higher
graudates of out—of—state law
tant. A partialtestof this
rts the pass rate of in—state
data in Table VI show that
by the American Bar Association
out—of—state schools during the
.ve narrowed and disappeared
shows the pass rates of
s of a more uniform and higher
tes of graduates from Stanford,
during the sixties and seventies
iversity of Michigan compare quite
rsity of California (Berkeley).1
pecific law has not been tested
has not been an important part
during the last 10 to 15 years.
rocedure may be gained through
in state specific law will have
oundaries. Certain types of
ents in state specific law. The
ally identified as national law
s of these three schools might26
TABLE VI
PASS RATES ON CALIFORNIA BAR EXAM OF GRADUATES










April1951 —Oct.1953 72.0 147.0
March1956 —Sept.1959 78.7 59.2
March1963 —Aug.1965 714.2 69.14
1969 —1971 70.6 70.3
1973 —1975 72.14 73.7'








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































practices of lawyers in private practice are more likely to involve state
law than salaried lawyers employed by firms. Nongovernment salaried lawyers
would include those lawyers working for firms and nonprofit institutions as
well as associate lawyers employed by law firms. Lawyers employed by firms
may devote a larger share of their time to federal law than lawyers in
private practice. Less can be said about the work load of associates.
Therefore, it is less clear whether associates make comparatively smaller
investments in state specific law than lawyers in private practice.'
There is, however, a competing hypothesis which may also explain a
lower interstate mobility for self—employed lawyers than for salaried
lawyers. Self-employed lawyers develop local reputations and suffer a
greater loss in goodwill if they leave the immediate market. This loss of
goodwill suggests that self—employed lawyers will be less likely to change
residence and will be more likely to remain in the same market if a change
of residence is made. Under this hypothesis a smaller proportion of self—
employed lawyers than salaried lawyers should move out of county of residence,
given that they remain in the state. By limiting the analysis only to those
lawyers who remain in the state, the effect of state law on mobility is
eliminated and attention can be centered on the differential effect on mobility
of the higher cost of mobility for self—employed lawyers.
Table VIII shows (1) the interstate mobility rate (I.M.R.), (2) the
probability of an interstate move given an out of county move (P.I.M.), and
(3) the probability of remaining in the same county given no change in the
state of residence between 1965 and 1970 (P.l.c.)forthree classes of
lawyers, salaried byprivatecompany (or nonprofit organization), government
a large fraction of associates are employed by the larger law


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lawyer, and self—employed. This table shows the interstate migration rate
and the probability of an interstate move is highest for the self—salaried
lawyer and lowest for the self—employed lawyer. The probability of remaining
in the county of residence given that the lawyer remains in the state between
1965—1910 is lowest for the salaried lawyer employed by firms and highest for
the self—employed lawyer. The lower interstate migration rate and probability
of an interstate move for self—employed lawyers suggests that state law does
depress the mobility of self—employed lawyers. However, among lawyers who
remained in the state between 1965 and 1970, a higher proportion of self—
employed lawyers remained in the same county of residence. Therefore, the
loss in goodwill suffered by leaving the immediate market is also capable
of explaining the lower interstate migration rate of lawyers. An additional
piece of evidence suggests that state law is not responsible for lower lawyer
mobility. Table IX shows I.M.R., P.I.M. and P.l.C. for Louisiana, a civil
law state, and the three adjoining states, Mississippi, Texas and Arkansas
presumably common law states. If there is investment in state specific law,
Louisiana should be the ideal test case. Yet, the comparison among these
states fails to reveal significant differences in mobility patterns.
Investments in state specific law are made over the years as a
practice is developed. If so, interstate mobility would decline more
rapidly with age in the legal profession than in other occupations once
other determinants are held constant. Private practice is one such deter-
minant. Out of market niobility should decline more rapidly with age in
those occupations where private practice is important. It is first necessary
to controlfor the effect of private practice on mobility before anyeffect

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Th regression analysis attempts to explain the interstate mobility
rates of younger relative to older member's of an occupation. The ratiQ o* the
I.M.R. for younger members of an occupation (between 25 and 1414 years old
in 1970) to the I.M.R. for older members (between 145 and 614yearsold) is
the dependent variable and is expected to be larger in occupations with
higher proportion in private practice, PRI—PRACT, and in occupations with
higher retention probabilities, P.l.C.Asomewhat different method of
determining the effect of private practice on relative interstate mobility
is also adopted. The ratio of the retention probability of younger relative
to older members of an occupation has been calculated to determine if occupa-
tions with higher ratios of the retention probabilities have lower ratios of
the interstate migration rates. The symbol assigned to the ratio of the
retention probabilities is R.P.I.C.
The effect of state specific law on mobility is detected by intro-
ducing a dwnmy variable for the legal profession. If state specific law
reduces lawyer mobility, the ratio should be higher for lawyers and the
coefficient of the dunimy variable will be positive.
The results are shown in Table X and indicate the ratio of migration
rates is higher in academic fields and in occupations where private practice
predominates.' On the other hand, the ratio of retention probabilities is
not related to the ratio of migration rates, a disappointing result.
The results on the importance of state specific law are of considerable
interest. The ratio of interstate migration rates for lawyers appears no
different from the ratios of other occupations once the effects of private
practice and university connection are accounted for.
unanswered issue is why PRI—PRACT affects the ratio of interstate
migration rates but not the level of I.M.R.33
TABLEX
ThE RATIO OF THE INTERSTATE MIGRATION RATE FOR YOUNGER




(i) (2) (3) (It)
** 1.CONSTANT 2.144 —3.57 —3.16 —3.99
** ** ** 2. UNIVER 1.17 1.26 1.12 .42
*11* *41* 3.PRI—PRACT 7.49 7.05 5.60
** ** it.P.l.C. 7.28 6.95
5. R.P.I.C. 9.16
6. LAW —1.13 —1.07 —.33 2.28
* *41* 7. DENT 2.65 6.98
8. DOC 1.52 4.38
.695 .7144 .780 .545
1.185 1.103 1.059 1.1t98 U
N 34 314 314 34
*
Denotest ratio between 1.60—1.99
**
Denotest ratio between 2.00—2.99
*41*
Denotest ratio above 2.99..31
In review, the results of these several tests point in one direction.
The comparatively low interstate flow of lawyers cannot be explained by in-.
vestments in state specific law.
Conclusions
Occupational licensing has had a quantitatively large effect in
reducing the interstate mobility of professionals. Placing further restric-
tions on the interstate movement of human capital by limiting the use of
reciprocity reduces interstate mobility still further, but by a diminishing
amount. While licensing may serve the role of a certifying instrument, it
has an important effect of restricting the flow of factors even in those
occupations where reciprocity wnong the states is practiced in some degree.
While the lower interstate mobility of lawyers could be traced to
investments in state specific law and procedure or to licensing through
the state bar exam,theresults of the tests suggest that the effects of
investment in state specific law are apt to be small. The lower mobility
of lawyers, like the lower mobility of dentists, appears traceable to
licensing and limitations on the use of reciprocity.
There are two directions in which this study may be extended. A study
of the effect of licensing and restrictions on reciprocity on earnings is
feasible and is a natural extension. Further analysis of the dental and
legal professions may be undertaken to determine if restrictions on the
interstate flow of human capital coincide with greater intrastate control
over the number and size of educational institutions than in licensed pro-
fessions with reciprocity or unlicensed occupations. A study of the reasons
for licensing in some and not other occupations would be valuable but progress
is apt to be small. Yet, such a study is necessary if the relative merits of
the cartel versus the certification hypothesis for licensing are to be evaluated.REFERENCES
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